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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using 
hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation 
building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking 
and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is that, 
political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by 
mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a 
range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of 
models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of 
extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and 
revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural 
resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility.  As a 
policy implication, there is a ‘sub-Saharan African specificity’ in ‘nation building’ and 
prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are 
contingent on the degree of fragility, since ‘fragile’ and ‘extreme fragile’ countries respond 
differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility. 
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1. Introduction 
 There has been renewed interest in state fragility by scholars and international 
development agencies. It has been substantially documented that, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is 
one of the regions in the world that eloquently reflects characteristics of state fragility
2
: weak 
governments, insufficient security and legal frameworks, ineffective administration, poor 
public services, high rates of conflicts and civil wars, growing extreme poverty, inter alia  
(European Report on Development, 2009; Marshall & Cole, 2009).  
 Since the 1990s, the performance gap between fragile states and non-fragile states has 
continued to widen over time. Empirical studies have established the perilous effect of this 
trend (Iqbal et al., 2008). Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) has shown that, the incidence of state-
fragility on per capita income plays out with many other development factors. Bertocchi & 
Guerzoni (2011) have concluded that, SSA’s sluggish development could be explained by 
state fragility. However, most of these authors are consistent with the position that, ‘extreme 
fragility’ is the major cause for worry. The Burnside & Dollar (2000) conclusion on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries with better institutions has been contested 
in many policy and academic circles (Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly et 
al., 2004; Chatelain & Ralf, 2012; Asongu, 2012a).  In spite of this interesting debate, 
Chauvet & Guillaumont (2004) have postulated that internal political instability substantially 
limits the effectiveness of aid. Accordingly, aid effectiveness in post-conflict situations is way 
higher than in the first decade of peace, notably, as from 4-5 years (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).  
 There is increasing evidence on the persistent character of the phenomenon of state 
fragility. In fact, the probability that a country that was classified as fragile in the year 2001 
remains in the same category in 2009 is 0.95. Accordingly, the 35 countries that were 
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qualified as fragile by the World Bank in 1979 still had the same fragile quality in 2009 
(European Report on Development, 2009). As shown by Andrimihaja et al. (2011), beside the 
common characteristic of weak economic growth among fragile states in comparison to non-
fragile states, the former states appear to be engulfed in a “fragility trap”. The results show a 
substantial qualitative difference between the former and the latter states. In fact, the glaring 
difference is the possibility of falling into a trap of inferior equilibrium: a country reflecting 
characteristics of a fragile state is susceptible of being engulfed in a vicious cycle of weak 
investment, feeble growth and poverty. Hence, it could be inferred from the highlighted 
consequences of state-fragility that, African countries which are already suffering from a 
plethora of economic woes are paying the hard price (Easterly et Levine, 1997; Sachs & 
Warner, 1997).  
 In light of the above, very few studies have examined the determinants of state 
fragility. Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012) have postulated that their predecessors have not gone 
in depth (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, 2005; Carment et al., 2008). They have complemented 
the existing literature by incorporating many factors: historical, institutional, demographic, 
social and economic. Their study is focused on SSA for many reasons. Firstly, as highlighted 
above, the issue is of crucial policy relevance in this sub-region. Secondly, state-fragility 
appears to be a multidimensional phenomenon. Hence, by limiting themselves to one specific 
zone, their results have more useful and focused policy implications. Moreover, the emphasis 
on one region mitigates issues of heterogeneity.  
 The present study is an extension of Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012) for two main 
reasons: on the one hand, we are using the same data base and; on the other hand, we are 
integrating a dimension not taken into account by Bertocchi & Guerzoni.  In SSA, states are 
not only fragile; many can also be qualified as “Nation-Building” (Green & Bandyopadhyay, 
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2012). Notwithstanding country-specific ‘nation-building’ and management processes, 
African states are also the result of politico-economic equilibriums (Green, 2012ab). Within 
this framework, fragility is characteristic of an institutional game. Accordingly, as 
substantially documented in recent literature, state actions and political regimes are largely 
determined by political economy (North, 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; North et al., 
2010; Baland et al., 2010 ; Acemoglu, 2006, 2008 ; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008a, 2008b, 
2000, 2005 ; Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2012 ; Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2011). The political game 
depends on those who hold de facto power and on those who determine de jure power. The 
dominant expression emanates from those who have the power to change circumstances.  
 In light of the above, we derive the hypothesis we shall test in the present study. The 
hypothesis could be stated as follows: state fragility is a function of lobbying by those holding 
de facto power, principally because they hold the voice of those who possess de jure power. 
And it is because of the desire to maintain their rents (maximize their utility function) that the 
powers in place sustain the fragility situations. The premise for this hypothesis is that, it is 
easier to enliven renting activity in fragile situations. Ultimately, this could reduce the effect 
of reforms and maintain the ‘equilibrium trap’ recently documented by Andrimihaja et al. 
(2011) and Andrews et al. (2012).  
 This hypothesis is particularly relevant in Africa, owing to the high influence of 
political actors (and the power grapping process) on informal institutions. Kodila-Tedika 
(2012) from the RDC
3
 perspective has emphasized how family influence (in the name of 
African solidarity) could be considered as a form of lobbying, susceptible of breeding 
corruption. This viewpoint is shared by Sardan (1996) and Sindzingre (1997). Indeed the 
African social fabric is largely influenced by social references like ethnic relationships, tribal 
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links and clientelism. With the administration confiscated and personalized, it is not 
surprising to notice that, everybody wants to become a politician. This is essentially because, 
these so-called politicians believe politics is the fastest and least risky means of self and 
family aggrandizement. While logically valid, empirical analysis of these behavoirs has 
stopped short of going in-depth due to the absence of relevant data. François et al. (2012) 
have recently constructed a database with which to appraise the sharing of power in autocratic 
African regimes.  The constitution of coalitions is defined along ethnic lines, a situation that 
could be explained by the apprehension of tensions. From a conceptual framework, North et 
al. (2010) have established that, insiders only accept newcomers into the elitist group only if it 
guarantees the clubs stability and sustainability. The growing relevance of diversity owing to 
rent seeking substantially reduces social welfare because lofty qualities (like competence) are 
no longer taken into consideration. The above scenarios have been summarized by Jacquemot 
(2005: 175)
4
. In such a social dynamic, our postulated hypothesis which is not incompatible 
with Besley & Persson (2009, 2010) is justified. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the data. The empirical results and corresponding discussion are covered in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Data 
 It is well acknowledged that fragility as discussed in the preceding section is a 
complex and multidimensional concept. In spite of the significant common characteristics in 
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fragile countries, a consensus in the definition of fragility has been hard to come by. This 
position on the conception and definition has been sustained by Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012), 
from whom we borrow an index with which to appreciate the notion of state fragility. The 
binary variable assumes the value 1 for IDA (International Development Association) 
countries in the bottom two CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) quintiles or 
without a CPIA rating, 0 otherwise.  
 Consistent with Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012), since our goal is to generate findings 
with relevant policy implications, for the empirical assessment, we select a definition of 
fragility that is in line with the direct influence on concessional lending and grants assigned 
by the World Bank (WB) via the IDA. With respect to the WB, fragile states are defined as 
low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below (over a 1-6 range) on the CPIA ratings. The 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) defines state fragility as those countries in the bottom two CPIA quintiles, 
as well as those which are not rated. Owing to the limited time series properties of CPIA 
ratings (which have been publicly available only since 2005), for the purpose of our empirical 
investigations, we use the OECD-DAC data on the distribution of the IDA member countries 
by CPIA quintiles which is available for the period 1999-2007.  
 For the purpose of this paper, to refer to CPIA ratings
5
 offer three main advantages. 
Firstly, the ratings have a crucial practical relevance, since as previously stated; they 
substantially affect aid allocation according to a specific formula. Secondly, information on 
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7 
 
their distribution by quintiles is now available for a relatively extended time period (1999-
2007). Thirdly, owing to their design, they do not mechanically reflect any of the variables we 
employ as regressors, so they can safely be employed to define our outcome variable
6
. We 
construct a dataset of 41 sub-Saharan countries for which we have relevant data from the 
CPIA ratio distributions by quintiles. For the selected countries, we defined a fragility dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if a country belongs to the bottom two CPIA quintiles or if it is 
not rated, 0 otherwise.  
 The outcome variable is the ‘capacity to govern effectively’. This indicator is 
produced by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). It evaluates the effectiveness in 
governing capacity by democratically elected officials as well as the existence of blocking 
powers (or political enclaves). The organs of government include, the head of state (or 
government) and parliament. States for which the government is not the outcome of elections 
which meet a minimum level of freedom and transparency (autocratic regimes) are evaluated 
according to their nature: dictatorial/autocratic or judicial/bureaucratic. ‘Blocking powers’ 
could be in the hands of the military, the clergy, land owners, the business world, inter alia; 
with the capacity to partially deviate from the democratic system without questioning it 
altogether. These actors can block the implementation of democratic decisions or preserve 
certain prerogatives (like the nomination of the chief of command in the arms forces). This 
point does not refer to the existence of the state itself. Hence, Guerilla movements, 
paramilitaries or outside the state (suburbs or rural zones) do not make-up the blockages 
outlined in the indicator. Accordingly, the indicator is evaluated by a scale of 1 to 10. The 
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higher the scale, the more there is a true capacity to govern and hence, less interferences 
linked to rent seeking and lobbying. When data is not available for a given country, we resort 
to the estimation in the note proposed by the Mo Foundation.  
 In the choice of the control variables, we consider certain statistically significant 
variables from the Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012) regressions. Education (Enrollprim) is 
measured by ‘primary enrollment over official school age population’. This proxy that is 
consistent with recent literature (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2012; Kodila-Tedika, 2013) is 
sourced from the World Bank Education Statistics 5.3. Life expectancy (Lifeexp) in 
accordance with Banks (2001) is measured by the ‘number of years of life expectancy at 
birth’. Fertility rate (Fertrate) in logarithm of the number of children per woman is obtained 
from the World Bank (2010). Govenment expenditure (Governm) and real per capita GDP (in 
logarithm) are obtained from the Penn World Table 6.2. These proxies are also consistent 
with recent literature (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2012; Kodila-Tedika & Agbor, 2013; Kodila-
Tedika, 2013). The ethnic fractionalization (Ethnicfract) measure is obtained from Alesina et 
al. (2003). Revolution (Rev) is captured by the number of revolutions, in line with the 
literature (Banks, 2001; Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2012; Kodila-Tedika & Agbor , 2013; Kodila-
Tedika, 2013). Resource abundance (Natural resources) is measured by a dummy variable. A 
country is considered as rich in natural resources if it is classified in the Collier & O’Connel 
(2006) list. Otherwise, a value of 0 is assigned it.  Hence, resource-rich countries are those 
which have a behavior that is modeled by natural resources. Simply put, a country is qualified 
as rich in the list when rents resulting from primary products exceed 30% of GDP. Hence, on 
the basis of this criterion, South Africa is not classified as rich in natural resources.  
3. Regression Results 
3.1 Without interactions  
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Table 1 below present’s the results of binomial estimations of state fragility. The target 
group (or case) is ‘state fragility’ while the reference group (or noncase) is ‘non-state 
fragility’. The results show Probit regressions without interactions (in the first two columns) 
and a robustness check with Logistic regressions without interactions (in the third column).  
The results of the former regression specifications are broadly consistent with those of the 
latter specifications.  
From the Probit estimation output, the following findings could be established. (1) The 
level of education, life expectancy, the degree of ethnic fractionalization and the weight of 
natural resources all insignificantly increase government effectiveness and hence,  
insignificantly reduce the probability of state fragility. (2) The fertility rate, government 
expenditure and per capita economic prosperity insignificantly mitigate government 
effectiveness and corrolarily; insignificantly increase the probability of state fragility. (3) 
Political interference and revolutions significantly reduce and increase government 
effectiveness respectively. Hence, increasing and reducing the probability of state fragility 
respectively. While a unit change in revolutions increases by more than 68% the probability 
of government effectiveness, a unit change political interference mitigates the same 
probability by about 1%. It is worth noting that, the effect of our variable of interest is highly 
significant. Political interferences in the forms of rent seeking and lobbying decrease 
(increase) the probability of effective governance (a country entering a situation of state 
fragility). Hence, an increase by 10% in governing capacity due to a decrease in political 
interferences also decreases the probability of state fragility by the corresponding percentage.  
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Table 1. Main results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Probit 
regression 
Probit regression, 
reporting marginal 
effects 
Logistic regression                                
Polinter -0.0309*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0110 -0.0525***    
(0.000) 
Enrollprim 0.0012 
(0.878) 
0.00004 0.0027    
(0.862) 
Lifeexp 0.03879 
(0.340) 
0.0139 0.0738 
(0.331) 
Fertrate -0.1122 
(0.743) 
-0.0401 -0.2584    
(0.693) 
Governm   -0.0053 
(0.760) 
-0.0019 -0.0112    
(0.728) 
Ethnicfract 0.3546 
(0.793) 
0.1266 0.4837    
(0.846) 
Real per capita GDP log    -0.1007 
(0.844) 
-0.0360 -0.2710 
(0.777) 
Natural resources 0.4923 
(0.414) 
0.1834 0.9434    
(0.450) 
Rev 1.9281***   
(0.004) 
0.6886 3.4585**    
(0.010) 
Wald chi2 44.82  30.04 
Prob > chi2      0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2        0.503  0.496 
Obs 65  65 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. All 
regressions include a constant term. P-values are in parentheses. Explanatory variables: 
Polinter, political interference; Enrollprim, Primary enrollment; Lifeexp, Life expectancy; 
Fertrate, Fertility rate (log), Govern, Government expenditures; Ethnicfract, Ethnic 
fractionalization, Rev, Revolutions.   
 From the estimations in Model 1, of the 25 countries that experienced state fragility 
crisis, 20 have been rightly predicted (with a probability higher than 0.5), while for countries 
that did not experience such a crisis, 34 of the 40 have been well predicted. In other words, 
the prediction rate of our model is at the height of 83.08%.  
11 
 
 The third column entails a logit model. Its specification is simply a replication of the 
the model in the first column. This gymnastic is a purely for robustness purposes, which is the 
reason we have not reported the marginal effects. Accordingly, but for a slight variation in the 
significance of the revolution variable, the logit results are broadly consistent with the probit 
findings. Hence, political interference and revolutions significantly reduce and increase the 
probability of governing capacity respectively. This conclusion is empirically in accordance 
with what Green (2011) qualifies as “Tanzania exceptionalism”: the success of Tanzania in 
the formation of a nation and prevention of ethnic conflicts.  
3.2 Results with interactions 
 Table 2 below shows results that replicate the specifications of Table 1 while taking 
the interaction effects into account. This enables the assessments of how the interactions (rent 
seeking & revolution and rent seeking & natural resources) play out on state fragility. 
Accordingly, the logit model serves as a robustness check. Based on the results, the following 
conclusions could be drawn. (1) The significance and signs of the estimated coefficients as 
well as the corresponding marginal effects are broadly consistent with those in Table 1. (2) 
The logit model estimations are also consistent with the probit specification output. (3) While 
the interaction of ‘rent seeking and revolution’ increases the probability of effective 
governance, the interaction between ‘rent seeking and natural resources’ does not have a 
significant positive incidence on the effectiveness of government. Hence, while the former 
interaction decreases the probability of state fragility, the latter does not have a significant 
negative effect on the probability of dissolving the state into chaos. (4) The marginal effect of 
the significant interaction term is around the height of 1%; implying a unit change in the 
interaction between ‘rent seeking and revolution’ increases the probability of government 
effectiveness by 1.31%. Hence, the inherent negative mechanism of revolution outweighs the 
established positive effect of rent seeking on state fragility.  More so, the fact that rent seeking 
12 
 
in ‘resource’-rich countries has no significant negative incidence on the probability of state 
fragility is an indication that, the presence of natural resources somewhat attenuates the ability 
of rent seeking to independently increase the probability of state fragility. (5) The prediction 
rates for Model 1 and Model 3 are 87.69% and 83.08% respectively.  
 
Tableau 2. Estimation with interactions  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Probit 
regression 
Probit 
regression, 
reporting 
marginal effects 
Logistic 
regression 
Probit 
regression 
Probit regression, 
reporting 
marginal effects 
Logistic 
regression 
Polinter -0.0519*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0138 -0.0928*** 
(0.000) 
-0.031*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0113 -9.0552*** 
(0.000) 
Enrollprim 0.0009 
(0.911) 
0.0002 0.0019 
(0.889) 
0.0017269 
(0.825) 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0043 
(0.769) 
 
Lifeexp 0.0467 
(0.260) 
0.0124 0.0962 
(0.231) 
0.0391 
(0.338) 
0.0139 
 
0.0750 
(0.324) 
Fertrate -0.1662 
(0.651) 
-0.0441 -0.3996 
(0.557) 
-0.1270 
(0.711) 
-0.0451 
 
-0.3103 
(0.638) 
Governm   -0.0069 
(0.690) 
-0.0018 -0.0159 
(0.590) 
-0.0052 
(0.766) 
 
-0.0018 
 
-0.0106 
(0.740) 
Ethnicfract 0.4098 
(0.753) 
0.1087 0.3892 
(0.873) 
0.4355 
(0.761) 
0.1546 
 
0.7545 
(0.777) 
Real per capita 
GDP log    
-0.1508 
(0.792) 
-0.0400 -0.3744 
(0.718) 
-0.0989 
(0.847) 
-0.0351 
 
-0.2578 
(0.787) 
Natural resources 0.5508 
(0.372) 
0.1633 1.2626 
(0.369) 
0.3325 
(0.677) 
0.1220 
 
0.4404 
(0.763) 
Rev 0.2949 
(0.692) 
0.0783 0.5945   
(0.649) 
1.9689*** 
(0.009) 
0.6966 3.6011** 
(0.030) 
Polinter * Rev 0.0493*** 
(0.004) 
0.0131 0.0944** 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polinter * Natural 
resources 
   0.0037 
(0.845) 
0.0013 0.0125 
(0.759) 
Wald chi2 37.67  29.23 48.50  32.90 
Prob > chi2      0.000  0.001 0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2        0.567  0.569 0.503  0.497 
Obs 65 65 65 65  65 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include a 
constant term. P-values are in parentheses. Explanatory variables: Polinter, political interference; Enrollprim, 
Primary enrollment; Lifeexp, Life expectancy; Fertrate, Fertility rate (log), Govern, Government expenditures; 
Ethnicfract, Ethnic fractionalization, Rev, Revolutions.   
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3.3 Extreme state fragility  
 Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2011, 2012) have constructed another proxy for extreme state 
fragility. This is simply a restriction of the fragility criterion from bottom two quintiles to the 
the bottom quintiles. Hence, in a hypothetical situation of extreme state fragility, the binary 
variables assume the value of 1 for IDA countries in the bottom CPIA quintile or without a 
CPIA rating, otherwise 0.  
 The estimations in Table 3 below are a replication of the specifications in the 
preceding two tables, with a change in the dependent variable (new state fragility index). 
Based on the results, two new findings could be established. Firstly, consistent with Bertocchi 
& Guerzoni (2011), we do not report the marginal effects because what matters at this 
juncture is the significance of the variable of interest. Hence, it is a means of testing the 
robustness of results in the preceding tables. Secondly, we notice a significant change in the 
behavior of the control variables, which confirms the empirical imperative of distinguishing 
‘fragile’ states from ‘extreme fragile’ states on two counts: if these two groups of states are 
significantly different, the signs and significance of the control variables should also be some 
how different. As obvious as it is, a visual comparison of the tables confirms this fact. 
Ultimately, in terms of the tested hypothesis, the results in Table 3 are broadly consistent with 
those in Tables 1-2.  
Tableau 3. Estimation for extreme state fragility  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Probit 
regression 
Logit 
regression 
Probit  
regression 
Logit 
regression 
Probit  
regression 
Logit 
regression 
Polinter -0.0718*** 
(0.001) 
-0.1259*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0785* 
(0.076) 
-0.1373* 
(0.094) 
-0.0616*** 
(0.003) 
-0.1072*** 
(0.002) 
Enrollprim 0.0220* 
(0.061) 
0.03843* 
(0.063) 
0.02231** 
(0.042) 
0.0386** 
(0.042) 
0.0221 
(0.137) 
0.0385 
(0.100) 
Lifeexp -0.0683 
(0.255) 
-0.1169 
(0.279) 
-0.0656 
(0.287) 
-0.1119 
(0.322) 
-0.0545 
(0.384) 
-0.0923 
(0.416) 
Fertrate -2.1447*** 
(0.002) 
-3.709*** 
(0.001) 
-2.092*** 
(0.005) 
-3.607*** 
(0.006) 
-2.4617** 
(0.023) 
-4.278** 
(0.019) 
Governm   0.0042 0.0071 0.0032 0.0052 -0.0035 -0.0046 
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(0.839) (0.834) (0.882) (0.875) (0.874) (0.899) 
Ethnicfract 6.2195** 
(0.011) 
10.8611*** 
(0.009) 
6.0853** 
(0.016) 
10.586** 
(0.018) 
5.2647** 
(0.037) 
9.252** 
(0.021) 
Real per capita GDP 
log    
-2.1303** 
(0.012) 
-3.6559** 
(0.016) 
-2.158*** 
(0.005) 
-3.677*** 
(0.009) 
-2.8391** 
(0.013) 
-4.860** 
(0.012) 
Natural resources -1.3332 
(0.145) 
-2.4167 
(0.107) 
-1.3085 
(0.155 ) 
-2.3667 
(0.123) 
1.1982 
(0.412) 
1.8036 
(0.448) 
Rev 3.637*** 
(0.002) 
1.4990*** 
(0.002) 
3.4316** 
(0.037) 
5.954* 
(0.052) 
4.0273** 
(0.041) 
7.068** 
(0.045) 
Polinter * Rev   0.0075 
(0.877) 
0.01354 
(0.892) 
  
Polinter * Natural 
resources 
    -0.1105** 
(0.016) 
-0.1853** 
(0.029) 
Wald chi2 31.39 29.55 29.85 29.12 28.94 28.37 
Prob > chi2      0.0003 0.0005 0.0009 0.0012 0.0013 0.0016 
Pseudo R2        0.6799 0.6751 0.6803 0.6755 0.7162 0.7117 
Obs 58 58 58 58 58 58 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include a 
constant term. P-values are in parentheses. Explanatory variables: Polinter, political interference; Enrollprim, 
Primary enrollment; Lifeexp, Life expectancy; Fertrate, Fertility rate (log), Govern, Government expenditures; 
Ethnicfract, Ethnic fractionalization, Rev, Revolutions.   
 With regard to the other control variables, the expected changes could be observed. 
First of all, based on Model 1, irrespective of specification (logit or probit), education, ethnic 
fractionalization, demographic pressure and economic prosperity have significant effects on 
the probability of state fragility. The first-two (last-two) have a negative (positive) effect on 
the probability of state fragility.  In essence, education (ethnic fractionalization) comes with 
an improvement in the possibility of citizens requesting checks and balances from the 
government (engenders the possibility of a political landscape based on ethnic lines). Also, 
economists have connected ethnic diversity with important economic phenomena like 
investment, growth, or the quality of government (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 
2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). The negative incidence of 
education on the probability of state fragility is logical because, literacy reinforces the 
constant quest for democratic institutions (and quality of government). The positive incidence 
of per capita economic prosperity on the probability of state fragility is logical from the 
perspective that, citizens would most probably engage in moves that threaten stability 
(political and economic) if they are unevenly benefiting from the fruits of national economic 
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prosperity. Even if the fruits of economic prosperity are evenly distributed, democracy and 
quality of government do not come with direct economic prosperity, but with respect to the 
time and level hypotheses (Asongu, 2011)
7
. The positive incidence of demographic pressures 
on the probability of a country descending into chaos could have a twofold justification:  the 
absence of preemptive measures by authorities to satisfy the burgeoning population with 
policies that guarantee some hope for a bright future and; the willingness of the citizens to 
engage in activities that guarantee some hopes for the future generation and posterity. The 
former explanation is justified by recent African development literature which has concluded 
that, positive demographic change in African would strangle only public finances in the long-
run (in comparison to private and foreign investments) if measures are not taken to encourage 
family planning and create a conducive investment climate (and ease of doing business) for 
private and foreign investments (Asongu, 2013a). The latter explanation on the willingness of 
citizens to demand, inter alia, social justice, employment and measures to curb inflation is 
eloquently justified by the recent Arab Spring (Asongu, 2013b).  
4. Conclusion 
This paper has assessed the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using 
hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation 
building has been integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent 
seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders has been tested. The resulting interesting 
finding is that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of 
state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after 
                                                          
7
 Moreover, as sustained by the literature (Asongu, 2012b; Dixit, 2004), attempts to effect the transition from 
informal to formal institutions is somehow complex since the introduction of top-down formal institutions have 
not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements. Dixit (2004) has presented an interesting 
argument as to how introducing imperfect rule-based institutions could actually make things worse, as they 
create outside opportunities for members of relationship based networks. Network members can then cheat on 
their partners and vamoose to operate in the rule-based system. A society could get caught in-between formal 
and informal institutional settings with neither working well.  
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controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with 
a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a 
scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences 
and revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural 
resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a 
policy implication, there is a ‘sub-Saharan African specificity’ in ‘nation building’ and 
prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are 
contingent on the degree of fragility, since ‘fragile’ and ‘extreme fragile’ countries respond 
differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility. 
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